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Answering a Fool According to His Folly:
Ruminations on Comparative Fault Thirty Years On
FrankL. Maraist*
H.Alston Johnson111*
Thomas C. Galligan,Jr.***
William R. Corbett****
"Answer a fool according to his folly, lest he be wise in his
own eyes.'

1

INTRODUCTION

Tort law does not always heed biblical admonitions, but it
generally has adhered to this one whether the fool, for purposes of
litigation, appears as a plaintiff or a defendant. In this piece, our
primary focus will be on the faulty plaintiff except insofar as the
defendant's level of fault might affect the recovery of the faulty
plaintiff. From the early development of intentional torts to the
modem applications of negligence and strict or absolute liability,
tort law generally has often denied recovery to the victim whose
conduct was not merely negligent but foolhardy-whether that
foolhardiness was expressed as recklessness, wantonness, or
willfulness. Traditional intentional tort law denied recovery to the
victim who consented to the intentionally harmful conduct of the
tortfeasor. With the advent of negligence in the nineteenth century,
the law generally denied any recovery for the foolhardy victim of
the negligent acts of another, but it went further under contributory
negligence and denied recovery to the merely negligent plaintiff
whose fault did not rise to the level of foolhardiness. In addition,
the traditional negligence rule was that a victim who assumed the
Copyright 2010, by FRANK L. MARAIST, H. ALSTON JOHNSON III,
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risk-one who voluntarily encountered a known risk-was denied
any recovery through application of the defense of assumption of
the risk. Conveniently, but misleadingly, what constituted
contributory negligence often overlapped with what courts called
assumption of the risk. Because the result-no recovery for the
victim-was the same in either case, the overlap did not matter.
As noted, in most cases, the foolhardy plaintiff also was
deemed contributorily negligent, a conclusion that the plaintiff had
failed to act reasonably under the circumstances for his or her own
protection. Such contributory negligence, like assumption of the
risk, was an affirmative defense that denied the victim any
recovery. In the twentieth century, usually by legislative action,
most states abandoned contributory negligence as an affirmative
defense 2 and now allow the victim, who failed to act as a
reasonable person to protect his or her safety, to recover some of
the damages from the tortfeasor under a form of comparative fault,
either of the so-called "pure" variety or in some modified form.
Thus, in most cases the foolhardy victim theoretically could
recover some damages under the theory of comparative fault,
although he would be barred from any recovery for the same
conduct by application of the other theory-assumption of the risk.
After the advent of comparative fault, some jurisdictions have
retained all or some part of assumption of the risk as an affirmative
(and complete) defense, either by legislation or by jurisprudential
rule. Others, like Louisiana, have recognized that in most instances
the same conduct that is contributory negligence is also properly
called "secondary" or "implied" assumption of the risk, and,
logically, because the legislature has said that a plaintiffs conduct
that contributes to the harm only reduces recovery, it would be
improper to apply assumption of the risk generally to bar all
recovery. Notwithstanding the demise of contributory negligence
as a bar to recovery and the rise of comparative fault, courts and
legislatures adhere to the belief that there is some conduct that is
worse than comparative fault. A tort victim's conduct may not be
merely the failure to act as a prudent person for his own safety, but
may be so foolhardy that, some would argue, the law should not
allow any recovery at all. But such an arguable policy-so
appealing in its simplicity-brings with it knotty questions
regarding how to implement it without drifting back to a bar to
recovery by the merely negligent plaintiff under theories of
negligence or strict liability.
2. See infra note 105 (discussing the few states that retain the contributory
negligence bar).
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The Louisiana legislature addressed this problem in 1979, for
effect in 1980, adopting pure comparative negligence as the rule to
govern recovery by a "faulty" plaintiff. It thereby eschewed
modified comparative fault regimes that other states had adopted,
such as the "equal to" comparative negligence approach (when the
plaintiffs fault equals that of the defendant or defendants, there is
no recovery at all) or the "greater than" approach (same result
when the plaintiffs fault is greater than that of the defendant or
defendants). 3 At the same time, the legislature did not address the
jurisprudential defense of assumption of the risk.4 Later, the
Louisiana Supreme Court promptly concluded that in the area in
which conduct could be considered both contributory negligence
and secondary or implied assumption of the risk, the latter defense
is subsumed into the new comparative fault rules. The court,
however, has recognized two situations in which conduct falls
within traditional assumption of the risk principles but does not
overlap with the conduct that customarily is considered
contributory negligence. One, of course, is express assumption of
the risk by contract. The effect of express assumption of the risk in
Louisiana is governed by the Louisiana Civil Code.5
The other situation is the one in which the victim voluntarily
encounters a known risk that is "obvious to all comers," sometimes
also referred to as an "open and obvious risk." Attending a hockey
game and sitting in seats higher than the protective barrier around
the rink is probably conduct that will be construed as voluntarily
encountering the risk of being struck by an errant puck. The same
may be said of sitting down the third-base line at a baseball game,
beyond the protective fencing, with respect to the risk of being hit
by a foul ball. In pre-comparative fault days, the plaintiff who
complained of being struck by an errant puck or ball would very
likely have been barred from recovery, and whether his conduct
was called "contributory negligence" or "assumption of the risk"
was largely immaterial. Barring recovery on the basis of the
plaintiffs conduct often made it unnecessary for the court to delve
3. See generally DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 505 (2001)
(discussing the "pure or complete system" of comparative fault and the "two
incomplete systems").
4. The legislature also provided that percentages of fault were to be
assigned to other involved persons, whether parties to the litigation or not. See
LA. CIV. CODE art. 2323 (2009). This was not essential to the comparative
negligence enactment, but was fateful in many ways.
5. See LA. CiV. CODE art. 2004 (2009) (nullifying any clause in a contract
that "in advance, excludes or limits the liability" of one party for causing
physical injury to the other party or for damages to the other party resulting from
"intentional or gross fault").
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into the knotty question of the duty owed by the defendant to the
plaintiff. Regardless of whether the basis was plaintiff conduct or
lack of defendant duty, the result was the same: the plaintiff
recovered nothing. Now, it might be more appropriate to say that
the defendant either had no duty to protect against the risk that
occurred or did not breach any duty that was owed.
The cases described in the preceding paragraph are not really
the same as the claim of a "foolhardy" plaintiff, although perhaps
persons who choose seats at an athletic event without considering
the potentially injurious consequences of their choices could be
described by some as foolhardy, even though this seems to strain
the plain meaning of the word. Are there instances in a pure
comparative fault scheme in which a plaintiff's conduct can be the
basis of a total bar to recovery rather than merely a diminution of
the amount of recovery? And if so, how is the court to conduct its
analysis?
This has been an uneven effort at best in the thirty years since
the enactment of pure comparative negligence in Louisiana. Some
of the effort has been judicial in nature, and some of it has been
legislative. For their part, the courts have struggled with the task of
defining what conduct falls within the "no recovery" category as
opposed to the "diminished recovery" category and in formulating
a theory of law that is just, easy to understand, and useful in
predicting future outcomes in litigation. Generally speaking,
conduct that is not merely contributing negligence subject to
comparative fault principles, but rather is foolhardiness or other
conduct that could arguably justify denial of any recovery, may be
addressed by concluding that: (1) the defendant did not owe a duty
to protect the plaintiff from this harm; or (2) the defendant's
conduct was not unreasonable in light of the plaintiff's conduct; or
(3) the defendant's conduct, if otherwise wrongful, was not the
legal or proximate cause of the plaintiffs damages. The extent to
which the courts are willing to construct a body of law that
essentially circumvents the principle of pure comparative
negligence effective in 1980, by concluding either that there should
be a total bar to recovery based on the plaintiffs conduct or
perhaps that there should be a full recovery despite the plaintiffs
conduct, is a major part of our discussion in this Article. There is
certainly an argument to be made that the legislature created an
overarching pure comparative fault regime and that, except where
provided by statute, the courts should not bar the recovery of a
faulty plaintiff, but merely reduce that recovery. The strength of
the argument derives from the legislature's express statement in
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Civil Code article 2323, and that interpretation is consistent with
6
the Louisiana Civil Code and with the legal positivist tradition.
The courts have not been alone in crafting circumventions of
comparative fault. Since the adoption of comparative negligence
thirty years ago, the legislature has adopted statutes that deny all
recovery to a plaintiff under certain situations that might otherwise
fall under the principles of diminished recovery inherent in a pure
comparative fault scheme. In other words, having passed the pure
comparative negligence scheme thirty years ago, the legislature
thereafter has been periodically engaged in providing exceptions to
it without an obvious blueprint for doing so. This, too, is a major
part of our discussion here. These statutes, when coupled with the
judicial tendency in some cases to deny recovery to the foolhardy
plaintiff under the various schema mentioned above, have arguably
resulted in a species of patchwork modified comparative fault
scheme, where in some cases, or some types of cases at least, a
plaintiffs fault can result in no recovery.
Thus, as much as we might prefer to say that the law is clear
and consistent, we know otherwise. As noted, the judicial and
legislative tinkering with pure comparative negligence principles,
though, is impossible to deny. The purpose of this Article is to
evaluate where Louisiana law is today in its treatment of the
foolhardy victim or other victims whose conduct might be such
that the law could logically and fairly deny recovery. Sometimes,
Louisiana law has answered the fool according to his or her folly
and permitted no recovery, but the results are not consistent, and
the theoretical basis is unclear and perhaps even incoherent. All
four of the authors have contributed to this Article in various ways,
summarizing for the interested reader how Louisiana arrived at its
present situation, thirty years on; how these conclusions have been
reached; who bears the burden of producing evidence; and the role
of presumptions in evaluating the conduct. We may profitably
begin with the judicial experience.
I. JUDICIAL REACTION TO COMPARATIVE FAULT

The primary issue considered in this part of the Article will be
the relationship between the duty-risk analysis and what has been
called the defense of open and obvious risk in the wake of
Louisiana's adoption of pure comparative fault, effective in 1980. 7
That is, does a defendant's duty to protect a plaintiff from a
6. See generally FREDERICK SCHAUER & WALTER SINNOTI-ARMSTRONG,
THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 29-32 (1996).
7. 1979 La. Acts No. 431.
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foreseeable risk of harm extend to an open and obvious risk? If
not, then, by definition, a court has the power to decide, as a matter
of law, that the defendant owes no duty to protect a particular
plaintiff from a foreseeable but open and obvious risk.
Alternatively, may a court conclude that while the defendant owes
a duty to protect the plaintiff from a foreseeable and open and
obvious risk, because the risk is open and obvious, the defendant
does not breach that duty by failing to obviate the risk? Or, might
the court conclude that the defendant does owe a duty to protect
the plaintiff against an open and obvious risk but that the plaintiff's
recovery may be reduced by her fault under ordinary comparative
fault principles? 8 And finally, could a court, after the adoption of
comparative fault, determine that the plaintiff assumed the risk
when she voluntarily encountered an open and obvious risk,
thereby barring recovery (as opposed to reducing recovery under
comparative fault principles)? It is this interlocking series of
questions to which we now turn and consider in light of Louisiana
Supreme Court jurisprudence since the adoption of comparative
fault.
The victim fault-scope of the risk issue is at the heart of a
long-standing academic debate between our co-author Professor
and Practitioner H. Alston Johnson and our friend Professor David
Robertson. Shortly after the adoption of pure comparative fault in
Louisiana, Professor Johnson contended that a court still has the
power to conduct a case-specific duty-risk analysis and decide
whether, in a tort case, one of three situations might be present.
The first is a situation in which the defendant's duty extends to
protect the plaintiff against his own fault, and thus there should be
no reduction in recovery by virtue of the plaintiffs fault. The
second is a situation in which the plaintiffs conduct is such that it
has removed the plaintiff completely from the ambit of protection
spread by the defendant's duty, and thus there should be no
recovery, even at a diminished level. And the third are the very
commonplace situations-thought to be the great bulk of the
cases-in which it would be appropriate to quantify the plaintiffs
fault and permit it to serve as a diminution of recovery. 9 What
Johnson argued was that the court could still, even in victim fault
cases, conduct a case-specific duty-risk analysis. To Johnson, a
court always has the obligation to define the scope of the duty in
8.

Portions of this section are adapted from

"HILL V. LUNDIN

[hereinafter

THOMAS

C.

GALLIGAN, JR.,

& ASSOCIATES" REVISITED: DuTY RISKED TO DEATH? (1993)

GALLIGAN, DUTY RISKED TO DEATH].

9. H. Alston Johnson, Comparative Negligence and the Duty-risk
Analysis, 40 LA. L. REv. 319 (1980).
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the case before it. He argued that even under comparative fault
principles, there are still Louisiana cases where the defendant's
duty is such that even the negligent plaintiff is entitled to recover
100% of her damages. That is, in such cases the defendant's duty
includes the risk of the plaintiff's contributing fault, and the duty is
so important from a societal standpoint that the negligent plaintiff
still ought to recover 100%.1 ° Naturally, according to Johnson,
there could also be cases where the plaintiffs conduct is so
egregious or the risk so open and obvious that the defendant's duty
does not extend to protect against the risk that transpired even
though the defendant may have violated some duty designed to
protect other members of society.
Professor Robertson disputed Johnson's view of the law on the
interrelationship between comparative fault and duty-risk."
Robertson argued that the defendant's duty ought to be defined by
the court, not in reference to a particular negligent plaintiff, but in
reference to a blameless plaintiff.12 He basically said that the
legislature created a pure comparative fault regime and that the
courts should not use a no-duty holding to bypass that legislative
intent. But how should the court merge duty-risk and pure
comparative fault? In essence, the court under Robertson's model
would engage in a duty-risk analysis at a higher level of generality
than would the court under Johnson's model. In the open and
obvious risk context, Robertson would contend that the duty
should not be negated because the risk is open and obvious. To
Robertson, if the duty extends to a blameless plaintiff, it would
extend to the blameworthy plaintiff who encountered an open and
obvious risk as well. The plaintiffs blameworthiness would
reduce, rather than bar, recovery.
It is worth reiterating some critical components of the
arguments. Johnson's argument contemplates and relies on a casespecific duty-risk application. He asks: in this case does the
defendant's duty protect this plaintiff from this risk that occurred
in this manner through, in part, this plaintiffs own particular
negligence? He deals with the specific facts before the court. To
Johnson, justice is meted out at the case-specific level with the
judge doing a lot of the meting as a matter of law. Robertson's
duty-risk analysis deals with a hypothetical case. He would ask:
does the defendant owe a duty to a blameless plaintiff to refrain
from the conduct that injured this plaintiff? If the answer to that
10. Id. at 333-34.
11. DAVID ROBERTSON, THE LOUISIANA LAW OF COMPARATIVE FAULT: A
DECADE OF PROGRESS 22 (1991).

12. Id. at 29.
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question is "yes," then the defendant owes a duty to the particular
plaintiff, and the jury must allocate fault between the plaintiff and
the defendant. 13 Robertson's method is a broader application of the
duty-risk method, arguably to categories of cases involving
hypothetical blameless plaintiffs rather than to the actual facts of a
particular case. The judge analyzes generally in deciding duty; the
jury analyzes more specifically when comparing fault.
Of course, Johnson's method gives the judge the primary
responsibility to decide whether the alleged duty encompasses the
plaintiffs negligence, and the intent of his article thirty years ago
was to preserve the duty-risk analysis with respect to such
questions rather than assume that the legislature meant to discard
the analysis without ever mentioning it. That is, under the Johnson
approach, the court, in part, decides the case-specific scope of the
duty question by determining whether the plaintiffs contributory
negligence is within the scope of the defendant's duty. As noted,
the judge has three options according to Johnson: (1) determine
that there is a duty under the facts involved and that the duty is
such that the plaintiff ought to recover 100%; (2) determine that
there is no duty under the involved facts and that the plaintiff
would recover nothing; or (3) in the vast majority of cases,
determine that there is a duty involved but that it ought to be left to
the jury to allocate fault under the comparative negligence
statute.
Stated differently, in the third group, the law is
indifferent to the precise result as a matter of policy, and, therefore,
it is permissible to let lay persons mete out "rough justice" in
allocating fault among all involved persons.
Alternatively, to Robertson, duty is more general, and fault
allocation, which is the jury's job, becomes a sort of case-specific
scope of duty question relating to the plaintiffs negligence. That
is, once the court determines that the defendant owes a duty to a
hypothetical blameless plaintiff (really to a class of blameless
plaintiffs), the jury then basically decides the scope of the duty
question (regarding this plaintiffs fault) as part of its allocation of
fault.
The early judicial resolution of the Johnson-Robertson debate
was evolving and uncertain.' 5 Then, in 1988, the Louisiana
Supreme Court decided Murray v. Ramada Inns, Inc.,16 one of the
most significant tort cases the court has ever decided, which,
13.
and the
14.
15.
16.

Of course the jury would first have to determine that both the defendant
plaintiff are at fault.
Johnson, supra note 9, at 332.
See, e.g., GALLIGAN, DuTY RISKED TO DEATH, supra note 8, at 77.
521 So. 2d 1123 (La. 1988).
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appropriately, was partially argued by Robertson and Johnson for
amicus curiae entities on either side. In Murray, a young man, who
was aware of the risks of diving into shallow water, dove into
shallow water at a Ramada Inn swimming poolf hit his head, was
paralyzed, and eventually died from his injuries. To the decedent,
the risk of injury from shallow water diving was open and obvious.
In this context, the precise legal issue before the court was whether
the doctrine of assumption of risk as a bar to recovery survived the
passage of the comparative fault statute.' 8 Prior to the enactment of
the statute, the case would have been decided under secondary
assumption of the risk principles and likely would have resulted in
no recovery.
The court, in a careful and thorough opinion by then-Justice
Calogero, determined that implied secondary assumption of the
risk did not survive the adoption of comparative fault as a bar to
the plaintiff's recovery. 19 Implied secondary assumption of the risk
arises where, even "though the defendant . ..is found to be at
fault, the plaintiff is barred from recovery on the ground that he
knew of the unreasonable risk created by the defendant's conduct
and voluntarily chose to encounter that risk."2 ° In jettisoning the
concept of secondary implied assumption of the risk, the court
reasoned that most secondary implied assumption of the risk cases
were basically nothing but contributory negligence cases. 2 1 Thus
the legislative decision to abrogate contributory negligence as a bar
also abrogated a bar to recovery under the moniker of assumption
of the risk, at least when that assumption of the risk was of the
secondary implied variety. 22 Critically, the court decided that
secondary implied assumption of the risk did not survive the
adoption of comparative fault, whether the plaintiff actually knew
17. Id. at 1125.
18. Id.at 1124.
19. Id.at 1129.
20. Id. at 1129. Implied secondary assumption of the risk must be contrasted
with implied primary assumption of the risk, where the plaintiff voluntarily
encounters a situation that involves "inherent and well known risks." Id. Implied
primary cases are those where everyone knows of the risk in general. Foul ball
cases, where spectators at baseball games are hit by wayward balls, falls into
this implied primary category. In Murray, the court said it is best to think of
such implied primary cases as no-duty or no-breach cases. Id.In Robertson's
terms, in an implied primary case, no duty would be owed even to the blameless
plaintiff. Implied primary assumption of the risk survives Murray. Finally,
express assumption of the risk, which occurs where the plaintiff expressly
contracts with another not to sue for future injuries, also survives. But see LA.
Ciw.CODE art. 2004 (2009).

21. Murray, 521 So. 2dat 1129.
22. Id. at 1129-30.
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of the risk he voluntarily encountered or merely should have
known of the risk he voluntarily encountered.23 Thus, secondary
assumption of the risk did not survive even where the plaintiff had
actual, subjective knowledge of the risk encountered.
In Murray, after losing the assumption of the risk argument, the
defendants argued that even if assumption of the risk no longer
existed, a court might still hold, under the facts before it, that the
defendants did not owe a duty to the plaintiff who had actual
knowledge of the risk encountered.24 The defendants pointed out
that when the plaintiff dove into the shallow water of the
swimming pool, he admittedly knew the dangers of shallow water
diving. 25 Of course, this is, in essence, Johnson's argument that a
court can employ a case-specific duty-risk analysis to bar recovery
(by holding that under the circumstances the defendants did not
owe any duty to the plaintiff). The defendants argued that, even if
it might have owed a duty to a blameless plaintiff, it did not owe a
duty to this plaintiff because this plaintiff actually knew of the very
risk that transpired.26 In fact, right before the fateful dive, the
plaintiff27 had warned his brothers of the dangers of shallow water
diving.

The court refused the defendants' invitation to hold that there
was no duty owed to Murray and, in doing so, stated:
If accepted, defendants' [no duty] argument would inject
the assumption of risk doctrine into duty/risk analysis
"through the back door."... A defendant's duty should not
turn on a particular plaintiff's state of mind, but instead
should be determined by the standard of care which the
defendant owes to all potential plaintiffs.28
The language seems to be an endorsement of Robertson's view
and a rejection of Johnson's theory. That is, the court seemed to
say: look at the defendant's hypothetical duty to all potential
plaintiffs, including blameless plaintiffs, and determine whether or
not there is a duty owed to them. If there is a duty owed to the
blameless plaintiff, then there is a duty owed to the blameworthy
plaintiff. If there is a duty owed to the blameless plaintiff, then
there is a duty owed to the blameworthy plaintiff who was
subjectively aware of the risk that she voluntarily encountered. The
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id at 1134.
Id. at 1135.
Id.
Id
Id. at 1125.
Id at 1136.
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plaintiff's knowledge of the risk does not negate the duty but,
rather, may reduce recovery under the comparative fault statute.
Thus, the scope of the risk, in relation to the plaintiffs fault is, in
essence, decided by the jury in reducing recovery, not by the court
in defining the defendant's duty.29 Furthermore, under the supreme
court's language, a trial court would seem to be without power to
decide that the defendant's duty does not extend to a particular
plaintiff who, because of his particular and peculiar knowledge,
knew of the risk but still engaged in a dangerous activity.
Language in some Louisiana court cases subsequent to Murray
was consistent with the Robertson view. For instance, in Socorro v.
City of New Orleans,3 ° the court said:
Therefore, Murray requires a review of the City's duty
separate and apart from any knowledge the plaintiff had or
should have had of the danger he was encountering. The
group of appellate court cases cited by the City for the
proposition that it had no duty to warn of the obvious
danger of diving into unknown waters, all barred recovery
by a partially negligent plaintiff under the label
"contributory negligence," "assumption of risk," or "no
duty owed by defendant." These opinions focused on the
knowledge and conduct of the plaintiff in concluding that
no duty was owed by the defendant. This method of
analysis has now been rejected by Murray, which explains
that the plaintiffs knowledge and conduct is considered
31
the extent of his comparative
only
to determine
negligence.
Thus, after Murray, one might have thought that the duty-risk
analysis in a case involving an open and obvious risk would not
involve any judicial inquiry or consideration of the plaintiffs
actual knowledge of the risk. Certainly, that was the initial reaction
to Murray. However, in negligence cases there is often more than
29. It should be noted that, customarily, scope of the risk is not a question
for the jury. Thus, it is appropriate to ask what it is about the enactment of a
pure comparative negligence statute that converted scope of the risk into a jury
question.
30. 579 So. 2d931 (La. 1991).
31. Id. at 941; see also Molbert v. Toepfer, 550 So. 2d 183, 186 (La. 1989)
("'[T]he fact that the plaintiff may have been aware of the risk created by the
defendant's conduct should not operate as a total bar to recovery.' Murray, 521
So.2d at 1134. Instead, the plaintiffs appreciation of the danger is among the
factors to be considered in assessing percentages of fault."). For an enduringly
important piece on Murray, see James Michael Chamblee, Murray v. Ramada
Inns, Inc.: The Expansion of Duty: A Step Towards the Reestablishment of

Proximate Cause, 49 LA. L. REv. 1003 (1989).
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one way to skin a cat, and that reality became apparent soon
thereafter in Washington v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.3 2 In
Washington, the supreme court did not waver from its duty
analysis in Murray; instead, it focused on another element of
negligence to deny recovery-breach.
Washington was a CB radio buff who had a tall antenna in his
backyard.3 3 Alongside the antenna was an uninsulated 8000-volt
electrical distribution line. 34 In 1980, Washington and his son were
moving the antenna when it contacted the uninsulated electrical
line.3 5 Washington and his son received shocks and bums.36 After
the accident, Washington said to his son, "That could have killed
the
me." 37 Washington also related to others the impression
3
accident had made upon him concerning safety. Thereafter,
Washington was meticulously careful.3 However, in 1985,
Washington was found dead in his backyard with the antenna lying
nearby.' Apparently, Washington had moved the antenna and
again come in contact with the distribution line, but this time the
consequences were fatal. 4 '
Washington's survivors sued Louisiana Power and Light (LP &
L), and a jury found for the plaintiffs.42 The appellate court
reversed, concluding that LP & L had not breached any duty owed
to the deceased.43 Critically, the appellate court grounded its
holding in the failure to establish a breach of the duty to exercise
reasonable care, rather than holding that the defendant owed no
duty to protect the plaintiff. The appellate court pointed to the
accident five years earlier as well as to the fact that Washington,
since 1980, had been extremely careful to avoid the distribution
Dennis,
line. 44 The supreme court, in an opinion by then-Justice
45
affirmed the result in the intermediate appellate court.
Justice Dennis analyzed the case under Judge Learned Hand's
negligence formula-balancing costs and benefits in light of the
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

555 So. 2d 1350 (La. 1990).
Id. at 1352.
Id. at 1351.
Id. at 1352.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1353.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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likelihood of the occurrence of the accident.46 Justice Dennis
apparently only used the formula to determine whether the
possibility of injury, or loss, constituted an unreasonable risk of
harm in light of the social benefits of the line and the cost to
insulate.47 Thus, he employed the Learned Hand formula only to
determine breach. But careful consideration of exactly what the
court said is apt. Specifically, whenever a court sets aside a jury
verdict (as the appellate court had done) and its opinion is based on
the failure to establish breach, the opinion necessarily resembles a
"duty or no duty" situation, especially when there is no discussion
of the applicable standard of review of jury verdicts. For instance,
in rejecting a jury decision, one would expect the appellate court to
state how and why the jury was manifestly erroneous in reaching
its decision. Moreover, it seems somewhat ironic to adopt
Robertson's approach to duty, looking at the blameless plaintiff,
and then have the court go back to a case-specific approach to
decide, contrary to the jury, that there was no breach. That is why
the cynic might interpret Washington as a no-duty case posing as a
no-breach case.
In Washington, the court held that the burden of insulating, or
otherwise protecting against electrocution risks from the electrical
line, was greater than the probability of the occurrence of an
accident multiplied by the loss that might have occurred if an
accident arose.4 8 Justice Dennis stated:
Under the circumstances, there was not a significant
possibility before the accident that Mr. Washington or
anyone acting for him would detach the antenna and
attempt to carry it under or dangerously near the power
line. Standing alone, Mr. Washington's 1980 accident
might have caused an objective observer to increase his
estimate of the chances that this particular antenna might be
handled carelessly. The other surrounding circumstances,
however, overwhelmingly erase any pre-accident
enlargement of the risk at that site. Except for the single
occasion of the 1980 accident, the antenna was stationed
safely in the comer of the backyard for many years, one to
three years before the 1980 mishap and five years
afterwards. Most of that time it was maintained safely in
the pipe receptacle which, by Mr. Washington's design,
allowed it to be lowered only in a safe direction. Between
46. Id. at 1353-54.

47. See id.
48. Id.
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his close call in 1980 and his fatal accident in 1985, Mr.
Washington had never been known to handle the antenna
carelessly. Indeed, after he and his son narrowly escaped
death or serious injury in 1980, his remarks to friends and
relatives indicated that the experience had convinced him to
keep the antenna far away from the power line. That he
continued to be aware of the danger and take exemplary
precautions to avoid it until his fatal accident was further
illustrated by the care that he and his friend took when they
lowered and laid it next to the fence several days before the
accident.
The likelihood that the antenna in this case would be
brought into contact with the power line was not as great as
the chances of an electrical accident in situations creating
significant potential for injuries to victims who may contact
or come into dangerous proximity with the powerline due
to their
49 unawareness of or inadvertence to the charged
wire.
One can see that, in deciding that there was no breach of the
applicable standard of care, the court considered Washington's
actual knowledge of the risk of danger from the distribution line in
his backyard to conclude that the probability of an accident
occurring was extremely low. This low probability led to the nobreach (or no-duty?) conclusion. The plaintiffs knowledge
essentially entered the case "through the back door," not to simply
reduce recovery, but to bar it. One may argue that the decision in
Washington is technically consistent with the Murray duty analysis
because the court was not considering actual knowledge to define
duty. However, actual knowledge was considered to conclude that
there had been no breach of the relevant duty. The result in either
case was the same: no recovery. Likewise, note that if Washington
is a breach case, the court made the decision about breach, not the
jury; the jury had concluded that, in fact, there was liability,
including breach. 50 And, there was no extensive analysis of the
applicable standard of review ofjury decisions.

49. Id.
50. In some ways the flipside of Washington was presented in Dobson v.
Louisiana Power & Light, 567 So. 2d 569 (La. 1990). In Dobson, the Louisiana
Supreme Court held that the family of an electrocuted tree trimmer could
recover from the electrical utility. Id. at 576. One of the main issues was
whether Dobson knew the risk posed by the distribution line that electrocuted
him. Id. at 573-74. The majority thought that he did not, while the dissenters
thought that he did. Id. at 577-81 (Cole, J., dissenting).
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Measuring Washington against Murray, as lawyers and courts
are compelled to do, would lead one to conclude that, after
Murray, a court cannot use the plaintiff's subjective, individualized
actual knowledge of a risk (knowledge that would make the risk
open and obvious to the plaintiff) to hold that the defendant did not
owe a duty to the plaintiff to protect against an unreasonable risk.
At the same time, after Washington, one can persuasively argue
that a fact-finder, or a judge reviewing a fact-finder's opinion, can
consider the plaintiffs subjective, individualized actual knowledge
of a risk to conclude that the risk is not unreasonable, and therefore
that the defendant did not breach the duty to the particular
knowledgeable plaintiff, even if the duty was owed to the
blameless plaintiff who was not aware of the risk. Therefore, after
these two cases, one might conclude that the plaintiffs actual
knowledge is irrelevant to the duty determination but relevant to
the breach determination. Finally, after Washington, it is
analytically possible that the plaintiffs actual knowledge of an
open and obvious risk might also be relevant in allocating fault,
assuming the jury gets that far. The fact-finder might find that,
even given the plaintiff's actual knowledge of the risk, the
defendant still breached its duty of care to the plaintiff. Then, the
plaintiffs actual knowledge would be relevant to the fact-finder's
allocation of fault.
The supreme court's next major foray into the open and
obvious morass came in Pitre v. Louisiana Tech University." Pitre
involved a tragic sledding accident on the campus of Louisiana
Tech in Ruston, Louisiana.52 During a rare ice and snow storm, a
student using a large plastic garbage can lid approximately five-tosix feet in diameter as a sled collided with the concrete base of5 a3
light pole located in a campus parking lot and suffered paralysis.
He had been joined on the lid by three other individuals, all in a
prone position, facing head first down a hill and launched by a
push from another individual. 54
The student and his family filed suit, contending that the
university had a duty to warn of the risks associated with sledding
near the parking lot or to protect against the injury by barricading
or otherwise covering the concrete base.5 5 Interestingly, in the first
paragraph of the opinion, Justice Victory, writing for the court,
stated: "Under the circumstances, we find that Tech had no duty
51.

673 So. 2d 585 (La. 1996).

at 586.
52. Id.
53. Id.at 587-88.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 588.
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since the light pole was obvious and apparent and the risks of
colliding with it while sledding are known to everyone." 56 Here,
the court seems to be applying Murray and Robertson's approach.
That is, the court said that the defendant owed the plaintiff no duty
because the risk was apparent to all and not merely to the plaintiff.
While that is the case, the method by which the court made that
determination merits further attention.
After reviewing the facts, the court turned to its legal analysis
and began as follows:
A landowner owes a plaintiff a duty to discover any
unreasonably dangerous condition and to either correct the
condition or warn of its existence. It is the court's
obligation to decide which risks are unreasonable, based
upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Whether a
particular risk is unreasonable is a difficult question which
requires a balance of the intended benefit of the thing with
its potential for harm and the cost of prevention.
In making this determination in negligence actions, the
"obviousness" and "apparentness" of the complained of
57
condition have historically been taken into consideration.
The court was stating apparent legal truisms. However, the
court seems to say that whether a duty is owed depends upon
whether the risk is unreasonable and that such a determination
involves a balancing of benefits and costs. If the risk is
unreasonable, the court seems to be saying that a duty is owed.
Alternatively, if the risk is not unreasonable, the court seems to be
saying that no duty is owed. Of course, that cost-benefit analysis is
precisely the cost-benefit analysis employed in Washington. But in
Washington the court employed a cost-benefit analysis to
determine breach. In Pitre,the cost-benefit analysis is particularly
interesting because the court used it to determine duty. Of course,
one might persuasively argue that the cost-benefit analysis used to
determine whether a risk is reasonable or unreasonable is the heart
of the breach decision and is one that should be conducted by the
fact-finder, rather than by the court as lawgiver in determining
duty.
Thereafter, the Pitre court turned to the portion of the Murray
opinion stating that the defendant's duty should not turn on a
particular plaintiffs state of mind, but must be gauged by

56.
57.

Id. at 586.
Id. at 590 (citations and footnote omitted).
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determining
the• standard
of care that the defendant owes to all
•
58
•
potential plaintiffs. Concluding that discussion, the court said:
Thus, the obviousness and apparentness of a potentially
dangerous condition are relevant factors to be considered
under the duty-risk analysis. If the facts of a particular case
show that the complained of condition should be obvious to
all, the condition may not be unreasonably dangerous and
the defendant may owe no duty to the plaintiff.59
This language is consistent with Murray's admonition about
the duty to all and with the court's initial statement regarding the
lack of a duty in the case before it, but tying in the unreasonably
dangerous concept seems to mingle duty and breach. Justice
Victory then went on to apply the cost-benefit analysis to the facts,
considering, among other things: the utility of the light pole, the
likelihood and magnitude of harm in light of the obviousness and
apparentness of the 6risk, the cost to prevent the harm, and the
nature of the activity. 0
In the final paragraph before its decree, the court stated, in part:
When deciding whether a condition is unreasonably
dangerous, the obviousness or apparentness of the
complained of condition is a factor to be considered as part
of the likelihood of the harm element. Under the facts of
this case, we find sledding is not inherently dangerous and
that the light pole and the danger of sliding down the hill
into the pole were obvious and apparent to all on the
evening of the accident. Thus the light pole did not present
an unreasonably dangerous condition and Tech had no duty
to warn of the apparent danger or take steps to protect
58. Id. at 590-91 (citing Murray v. Ramada Inns, Inc., 521 So. 2d 1123,
1136 (La. 1988)).
59. Id. at 591.
60. When considering the nature of the activity, the court stated:
It is common knowledge that one must be able to steer to avoid
colliding with fixed objects while sledding. Despite his familiarity with
the campus and the parking lot, Pitre chose to sled, on his back, head
first, down a hill on a device over which he had no control. While Pitre
claims not to have perceived the danger, if true, he clearly was
unreasonable in not doing so and taking simple measures, such as
sledding feet first and on a sled not so slippery, to protect himself.
Id. at 593. Of course, if the plaintiff did not perceive the danger and behaved
unreasonably, then would it be more appropriate for recovery to be reduced
rather than barred? The answer would seem to be "yes," unless any and every
reasonable person would have perceived the danger, in which case there would
be no duty owed to the blameless plaintiff under the Murray approach.
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Pitre under
Since Tech had no duty to 61
against injury ....
these facts, the defendants cannot be held liable.
Once again, here, the court is considering knowledge of
everyone on campus that evening, i.e., knowledge of all. This
focus is consistent with Murray's duty analysis. By concluding that
the risks of sledding near the unguarded light pole were obvious to
all, the court determined that the defendant owed no duty to the
plaintiff to protect against that obvious risk.6 2 In this regard, its
analysis is consistent with Murray. At the same time, the court
engaged in a balancing of costs and benefits that is arguably
conducted when answering the breach question (as it was in
Washington, albeit in rejecting a jury determination of breach),
rather than the duty question. Critically, it was precisely the costbenefit balancing at the breach level that justified the no-liability
decision in Washington, albeit based on Washington's particular
knowledge rather than the knowledge of all.
There were a number of dissents and concurrences in Pitre.
Perhaps most relevant for present purposes is Justice Lemmon's
concurrence in which he argued that the decision was justified as a
its duty to the plaintiff,
decision that the defendant did not breach
63
rather than as a no-duty determination.
What was becoming apparent, after Pitre, was that the socalled open and obvious risk issue involves deciding how to treat
legally the plaintiff's actual knowledge of a particular riskirrelevant to duty under Murray and Pitre, arguably relevant to
breach under Washington, and clearly relevant to comparative fault
allocation if the case goes that far. Additionally, what was
becoming opaque was the overlap between duty and breach
decisions. To further recap in midstream, implied secondary
assumption of the risk did not survive the adoption of comparative
fault in Louisiana. Thus, if the defendant's conduct poses a risk of
unreasonable harm to a blameless plaintiff or class of plaintiffs,
then the defendant owes a duty to a particular plaintiff who is
aware of the risk that the defendant's harm posed to him. The fact
that the plaintiff is aware of the risk and still encounters it will
result in reduced recovery rather than no recovery. This seems to
be the lesson of Murray.
Alternatively, in Washington, the court seems to have held that
a plaintiffs knowledge of a particular risk can be taken into
account in determining whether the defendant breached any duty
61. Id. at 596.
62. Id.
63. Id. (Lemmon, J., concurring).
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owed to the plaintiff. Thus, after Washington, the adept defense
lawyer knows that the plaintiffs particular knowledge is not
relevant to a duty determination but is relevant to a breach
determination. After Pitre, things did not change significantly,
although the court's approach to analyzing duty involved a
balancing of costs and benefits, the same balance used in
Washington to determine breach. Of course, the Pitre court's
emphasis on global knowledge (knowledge of all), rather than the
plaintiffs particular knowledge, is consistent with Murray. In that
regard then, perhaps the court's analysis indicates that it is
appropriate for courts to engage in a global cost-benefit analysis at
the duty stage of the case, as in Pitre-costs and benefits to all in
light of risks known to all-and to leave it to the fact-finder to
engage in more a specific cost-benefit analysis at the case-specific
breach level, as in Washington (albeit in rejecting a jury decision).
It might be said that Pitre closed the initial group of open and
obvious post-comparative fault cases. However, it is inevitable that
cases involving what defendants claim are obvious risks will
continue to be grist for the judicial mill. And, since 2004, the
Louisiana Supreme Court has considered several open and obvious
risk cases. The first was Hutchinson v. Knights of Columbus,
Council No. 5747,64 involving a slip and fall at a festival. In March
1998, Mr. and Mrs. Hutchinson visited the Crawfish Festival in
Chalmette, Louisiana. 65 They entered the festival 6grounds between
two amusement rides and exited the same way. As they exited,
Mrs. Hutchinson tripped and fell on electric cables that were being
used to power the rides. 67 The defendant moved for summary
judgment, arguing that the plaintiffs were not on a pedestrian
walkway.6 8 At the time of the fall, the defendant contended that
there were barricades in place for the purpose of restricting access
to the area and that in order for the plaintiffs to access the area they
would have had to circumvent the barricades. 69 The plaintiffs
responded by claiming that they had looked for an entrance to the
fairgrounds and, seeing none, followed others onto the fairgrounds
between the two rides. 0 They also stated that they did not cross
any barricades to enter or exit the festival. 71 Despite these factual
differences of opinion, the trial court granted the defendant's
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

866 So. 2d 228 (La. 2004).
Id. at 230.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 230-31.
Id. at 231.
Id.
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motion for summary judgment, and the appellate court reversed.72
In considering the scope of the defendant's duty, the supreme court
said:
It is accurate to state that defendants generally have no duty
to protect against an open and obvious hazard. If the facts
of a particular case show that the complained of condition
should be obvious to all, the condition may not be
unreasonably dangerous and the defendant may owe no
duty to the plaintiff [citing Pitre]. Specifically, in the trip
and fall case, the duty is not solely with the landowner. A
pedestrian has a duty to see that which should be seen and
is bound to observe whether the pathway is clear. The
degree to which a danger may be observed by a potential
victim is one factor in the determination of whether the
condition is unreasonably dangerous. A landowner is not
liable for an injury which results from a condition which
should have been observed by the individual in the exercise
of reasonable care or which was as obvious to a visitor as it
was to the landowner.
However, as the Court of Appeal in the instant case noted,
whether a condition is unreasonably dangerous requires
consideration of (1) the utility of the complained of
conditions; (2) the likelihood and magnitude of harm,
which includes the obviousness and apparentness of the
conditions; (3) the cost of preventing the harm; and (4) the
nature of the plaintiffs activities in terms of its social
utility or whether it is dangerous by nature. From the
affidavits in the record, a genuine issue of material fact
remains as to whether a tripping hazard extended through a
pedestrian pathway.73
In essence then, the court noted that if the condition is open
and obvious to all, the condition may not be unreasonably
dangerous, and no duty may be owed. The court's language
concerning the pedestrian's duty to see that what should be seen
might be read to apply not just to the particular pedestrian, but to
all. This reading would be consistent with Murray. Of course, the
court also seems to tie the existence of the duty to a determination
of whether or not the risk is unreasonable, as the court did in Pitre.
Again, this analytical focus may conflate the duty and breach
elements of negligence, thereby transferring the jury's power to
determine breach to the court to determine duty or no duty. Of
72.
73.

Id.
Id. at 234-35 (citations omitted).
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course, the court's conclusion that genuine issues of material fact
prevented summary judgment gives solace to those who may be
concerned that the court's opinion in Pitre might deprive the jury
of its important decision-making power concerning breach.
The supreme court's two most recent decisions dealing with
allegedly open and obvious risks were both per curiam opinions
and, in many ways, have muddied the analytical waters even
further. The first is Dauzat v. Curnest Guillot Logging Inc.74 In that
case, an experienced logging truck driver sued various parties,
including a landowner, for injuries he suffered when he struck a
hole in a logging road.75 The landowner, who had no part in
building or maintaining the road, moved for summary judgment.76
The plaintiff admitted that he could have avoided the hole if he had
seen it, that it was a sunny day when the accident occurred, and
that the road was wet and muddy.77 He stated that although there
was no standing water over the hole, he did not see it.7 8 The
plaintiff also stated that the logging road at issue got worse with
every load, and he had told the logging company to fix it, but no
one ever smoothed the road. 79 The plaintiff also said, "[I]f anybody
knows anything about logging, you are coming out with a thousand
pounds every time you come out on a soft road, the road does
nothing but get worse." 80 The plaintiff acknowledged that he had
no contact with the landowner and that no one from the
landowner's office ever came to the job site. 8 1 The trial court
denied the motion for summary judgment, the court of appeal
affirmed, but the supreme court reversed. 2
The court began its analysis by citing and relying upon the
Hutchinson language quoted above. Then, the court, reminiscent of
its analysis in Pitre and Hutchinson, analyzed the social utility of
the logging road, noted that the evidence conclusively established
that logging roads are normally not paved or improved, and found
that driving a logging truck is dangerous by nature. 83 To the court,
the crucial factor for consideration was the substantial likelihood
and magnitude of harm from the hole, including consideration of

74. 995 So. 2d 1184 (La. 2008).

75. Id.
at 1185.
76. Id.
77. Id.
at 1185-86.
78. Id.at 1186.

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.
at 1185-86.
Id.
at 1187.
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whether the
or that:
obvious.84 In light of all the
evidence,
the hole
court was
wentapparent
on to state
Taken as a whole, this evidence establishes that [the]
plaintiff was aware of the condition of the logging road,
having traveled over it several times on the day of the
accident. Moreover, the hole was not unusually large, as
shown by [the] plaintiffs testimony that he "never even
thought twice about it" after he hit it. Under these
circumstances, we must conclude that the presence of the
hole in the logging road was an obvious danger which did
not create a significant likelihood of injury.
In the instant case, Lake Pearl [landowner] established
through deposition testimony and affidavits that it did not
breach its duty to protect [the] plaintiff against an
unreasonably dangerous condition in the road. [The
p]laintiff failed to produce any evidence which would
establish a material factual dispute. Accordingly, the
district court erred 85in denying Lake Pearl's motion for
summary judgment.
The language is somewhat puzzling, although perhaps one may
sensibly read it in light of Murray, Washington, and Pitre.First, let
us deal with the puzzling aspects of the language and approach. In
the first sentence quoted immediately above, the court focuses on
what this particular plaintiff knew about the road and his personal
travel earlier in the day, even though it had earlier-in citing
Hutchinson-referredto what was obvious to all. Then, the court
notes that the hole was not particularly large, a fact that would
seem to make the hole less obvious rather than more so. This is
important because the plaintiff testified that he did not know about
the hole. Thus, in essence, perhaps he should have known but did
not, for purposes of the motion, actually know. Finally, in the
second paragraph the court concludes that there was no breach; it
apparently does not decide the case on a no-duty basis, but rather
held there was no breach.
Turning to Murray, Washington, and Pitre,Dauzat is really not
a Washington-type case because Dauzat, unlike Washington, did
not have actual knowledge of the risk. But, could it be said that the
risk was obvious to all? Perhaps not, if it was a small risk.
However, what may have been open and obvious to all
experienced logging truck drivers, a class to which Dauzat
84. Id.
85. Id.
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belonged, was that logging roads are frequently wet, muddy, and
riddled with holes. As such, one might say Dauzat could be
understood to hold that if the plaintiff is a member of a class of
people who, because of their profession or experience, have
knowledge of a general risk that would be open and obvious to all
members of the group, then a member of the group who encounters
the risk may not recover because there is no duty owed to members
of the group because of the obviousness of the risk vis-A-vis the
group, a reading that would be consistent with Murray.
Alternatively, one could read Dauzat as consistent with Pitre
because since the risk was obvious to all experienced logging truck
drivers, the road and the hole did not present an unreasonable risk
of harm.
Eisenhardtv. Snook 86 is more challenging. Don Eisenhardt was
Dorles Snook's live-in boyfriend.87 On the day in question,
Eisenhardt was working outside, and Ms. Snook was working
inside. 88 When Eisenhardt finished his outside work, he went
inside to take a bath.89 While he was inside, Ms. Snook attempted
to take a full bag of trash outside, but the bag broke on the steps
emptying its contents, including eggs, squash, and other trash.96
Ms. Snook swept the steps and sprayed them with water. 9 ' In the
meantime, Eisenhardt had finished bathing and had dressed to go
to the store. 92 As he exited the front door with a soda in one hand
and his wallet in the other, he slipped and fell on what he claimed
was a slick film of eggs and squash-the remains of the spilled
garbage. 93 Eisenhardt filed suit against Ms. Snook and her
insurer. 94 At the conclusion of the trial, the court entered judgment
for the defendants. 95 The trial judge explained as follows:
Aside from the credibility issues that I don't think it's
necessary to get into, I do think that he was probably
injured, probably fell, but we just don't live in a perfect
world. And just because somebody gets hurt that doesn't
mean that somebody gets paid a big chunk of money.
86. 8 So. 3d 541 (La. 2009).
87. Id. at 542. This fact does not seem particularly determinative of
anything, except perhaps the plaintiff's familiarity with the defendant's home;
however, the court does mention that.

88. Id.
89. Id.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 542-43.
Id. at 543.
Id. at 542.
Id. at 543.
Id. at 542.
Id. at 543.
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That's just the way it is. Now when you go into a grocery
store the standards are a little bit higher, and the reason for
that is because the grocery stores have on, and stores in
general, have on display items that they want you to
purchase. So they draw your attention intentionally to those
items on the shelf and the customers are in there and
they're not necessarily looking down at their feet. But all of
us have to look where we're going. I mean you learn that
when you're two years old and walking that you have got
to watch where you're going. And he was not looking
where he was going. She had washed down the steps. He
should have seen the water and known that there was a
hazard. I almost slipped down the other day when it was
raining at my house[,] that I've lived all my life practically
in[,] on some steps that were wet. Whose fault was it? It
was my fault. I wasn't careful enough. I knew it was wet,
could look and see that it was wet, and I wasn't careful
enough. If I would have fallen it would have been my fault.
You have to watch where you're going. And based on that I
just do not think that liability-that there's liability present
here because I think it's all Mr. Eisenhardt's fault. 6
Clearly, the trial court found for the defendants, but it is not
clear exactly which element of the negligence analysis he
concluded that the plaintiff did not establish. No duty? No breach?
And if the obligation of the plaintiff was to watch where he was
going, is that because the eggs and squash would be open and
obvious to all? In the end, the trial judge said that he found that the
accident was "all" the plaintiffs fault. 97 Does that mean that the
judge was allocating 100% of the fault to the plaintiff or that he
was resuscitating the doctrine of plaintiffs negligence as a bar to
recovery? On appeal, the appellate court reversed, concluding that
the trial court made a factual determination that the slime presented
a hazard and that the trial court concluded that the plaintiff was
100% at fault. 98 Disagreeing with that conclusion, the court of
appeal reallocated fault at seventy percent to the plaintiff and thirty
percent to Ms. Snook. 99
Then, the supreme court reinstated the trial court's judgment,
relying upon lanpage from Dauzat that was based on language
from Hutchinson. 00 Next the court said:
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 543-44.
Id. at 544.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 544-45.
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In the case at bar, the court of appeal premised its opinion
on a finding that the district court made a factual
determination that an unreasonably dangerous condition
was created when Ms. Snook washed the steps after spilling
trash on them. However, a complete reading of the district
court's reasons for judgment reveals that it made no such
finding. Although the district court referred to a "hazard," it
did so in the context of explaining that Mr. Eisenhardt
"should have seen the water and known that there was a
hazard." The court further stated, "I think it's all Mr.
Eisenhardt's fault." From these statements, it was obvious
that the district court made a finding that Ms. Snook was
not liable for Mr. Eisenhardt's injuries because the
condition of the steps should have been observed by Mr.
Eisenhardt in the exercise of reasonable care.
An appellate court may not set aside a district court's
finding of fact in the absence of manifest error or unless it
is clearly wrong. On review, an appellate court must be
cautious not to re-weigh the evidence or to substitute its
own factual findings just because it would have decided the
case differently.
Although the court of appeal purported to affirm the
district court's factual findings, it is readily apparent that
the court of appeal actually rejected these findings. Based
on our review of the record, we find no manifest error in
the district court's factual determination that the condition
of the steps should have been open and obvious to Mr.
Eisenhardt. While the steps may have been slippery due to
water, not every minor imperfection or defect in a thing
will give rise to delictual responsibility. The record further
supports the district court's finding that Mr. Eisenhardt,
who walked out of the house carrying items in both of his
hands, was not acting with sufficient care at the time of the
accident.
In summary, we find the record supports the district
court's determination that Mr. Eisenhardt should bear all of
the fault for this accident. The court of appeal erred in
holding otherwise. Accordingly, we will reverse the
judgment of the court of appeal insofar as it reverses and
and
amends the district court's judgment, and reinstate
10
affirm the district court's judgment in its entirety. 1

101.

Id. at 545.
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This language raises more questions than it answers. In the first
paragraph, the court seems to be saying that the appellate court
erred in reading the trial court's reasons for judgment as finding
that the slime presented an unreasonable risk of harm. But why
was that an unreasonable risk of harm? It was unreasonable
because the slime should have been observed by the plaintiff-not
what was actually observed or would have been observed by all,
but what should have been observed by that plaintiff. In the next
paragraph the court appropriately notes an appellate court's
obligation to give deference to a trial court's factual findings but
that giving deference is less appropriate on legal questions, such as
duty. Then, the court says that the trial court was not manifestly
erroneous in finding that the condition of the steps should have
been open and obvious to the plaintiff. But would it be open and
obvious to all, as Murray seems to require? Or actually known to
the plaintiff, as in Washington? Or obvious to a particular class of
plaintiffs because of their profession or experience, as in Dauzat?
The class of live-in boyfriends? Then the court states that when the
plaintiff walked out of the house, he was not acting with sufficient
care. But should that fact result in a reduction of recovery, rather
than no recovery? Finally, the court says that the plaintiff should
"bear all of the fault." But that reads as if the plaintiff is 100% at
fault. However, for the plaintiff to be properly allocated 100% of
the fault, that would mean that it was analytically possible to
allocate some fault to the defendant, but that would require a
breach of the appropriate standard of care, and the court seemed to
reject that possibility in the first three paragraphs quoted above.
So, where are we with the open and obvious risk dilemma, in
light of the Louisiana Supreme Court jurisprudence considered
above? We may confidently posit that we are all confused, but we
will endeavor to provide some interpretive guidance. First, we
know that, per Murray, if the risk is open and obvious to all, then a
court could properly hold that the defendant owes the plaintiff no
duty vis-A-vis that known risk. This is sensible, is consistent with
Robertson's approach and, for that matter, Johnson's method, and
does not undermine the comparative fault regime by allowing a
plaintiff's negligence to operate as a bar to recovery in a case
where the defendant's conduct poses a risk of harm to the
hypothetical blameless plaintiff.
Second, we can read Dauzat to mean that the Murray "open
and obvious to all" concept may be subject to a somewhat more
nuanced reading that looks at whether the risk is open and obvious
to a group of plaintiffs who have a particular or heightened
awareness of the risk or class of risks because of their profession or
experience.
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Third, we know that, per Pitre, a court may sometimes
consider the openness and obviousness of the risk to all in the
context of deciding the scope of the defendant's duty by balancing
costs and benefits to determine whether the thing or conduct
presents an unreasonable risk of harm. One might argue that
balance is normally a question for the fact-finder when deciding
breach and that conflating the breach and duty elements can result
in a potential misallocation of decision-making responsibility,
which strengthens the judge's role and potentially weakens the
jury's. Of course, one might also conclude that it is appropriate for
the court, when analyzing duty, to balance costs and benefits at a
general or policy level, leaving it to the jury to conduct a more
case-specific cost-benefit analysis as part of the breach element.
Be that as it may, even in Pitre the court focused on what was
known to all, not what was known to the particular plaintiff.
Fourth, we know that confusion continues to abound from the
language used in particular cases, and the court's recent opinion in
Eisenhardt may be the most troubling of all because it seems to
deny recovery as a result of what a particular plaintiff should have
known rather than what all would know and rather than what the
particular plaintiff actually knew. In doing so, the court arguably
revives the doctrine of plaintiff negligence as a bar to recovery,
although that was probably not its intent.
What are the policy implications of the issue, given the
purposes of tort law? We will here briefly consider the issue from
the perspective of morality, deterrence, legislative supremacy, and
the administration of justice. Morality or fairness provides no
singularly persuasive rationale for how to treat the open and
obvious risk. From one perspective, if a defendant has, through its
fault, created an open and obvious risk, it seems unjust for the
defendant to escape liability or responsibility for creating that risk.
Likewise, one might argue that it seems unfair for a plaintiff who
is aware of an open and obvious risk to recover when he suffers
injury after having encountered that risk. But to deny recovery to
the plaintiff for moral reasons is to sanction not holding the
defendant responsible for the risk it has created, which is not a
morally consistent position. Perhaps one could justify denying
recovery if one says that the plaintiff was in the best position to
avoid the risk at the last relevant moment. However, that seems to
say that morally the last negligent actor is somehow worse off than
an earlier negligent actor-a judgment that cannot be made on a
global moral level, but depends upon particular factual and cultural
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contexts. 10 2 Arguably, it is morally justifiable to deny recovery or
responsibility where the risk is known to all because then
everyone, not just the plaintiff, would be aware of the risk, and the
moral defendant may take that fact into account in deciding how to
act because she can rely on people who are aware of the risk not to
voluntarily encounter it and place themselves in harm's way.
Deterrence would seem to point toward allowing recovery as a
rule. In this context, we use deterrence to mean providing an
incentive to actors to take account of the possible costs of their
activities before they act. Here, if defendants know they will not be
responsible for open and obvious risks, they will not take account
of the costs that those risks pose to others when deciding how to
act. Likewise, if plaintiffs know they will not recover when they
encounter an open and obvious risk, that may have some deterrent
effect on them, but none on the defendants. Consequently, an
allocation of fault seems to provide some sense of rough deterrence
to each party.
Particularly in Louisiana, as a civil law jurisdiction, adherence
to the notion of legislative supremacy is appropriate, and here one
must give great deference to the 1980 implementation of a (mostly)
comparative fault regime, as well as to the 1996 legislation that
extended the comparative fault principles to virtually all at-fault
actors. Thus, any rule or system of rules that tends to undermine
comparative fault principles to either allow the faulty plaintiff to
recover 100% (a subject to which we have not addressed much
attention because to date the courts have not) or to allow the faulty
defendant to escape liability must be viewed with some skepticism
and, if allowed to exist at all, must be kept in relative check.' ° 3
As for the administration of justice, the main concern here may
be with simplicity, clarity, and the allocation of responsibility
between judge and jury and between trial and appellate courts. The
simple rule of Murray is clear and easily applied. The gloss that
has been applied since brings some confusion. The Johnson
approach is likewise clear and transparent because it requires
courts to clearly articulate their reasons for decision and preserves
the carefully constructed edifice of duty-risk analysis so
painstakingly crafted by Louisiana judges over a generation.
102. Moreover, focusing on a party having the opportunity to avoid the risk
"at the last relevant moment" raises the specter of "last clear chance" as a
cleansing argument for a faulty plaintiff-a concept happily consigned to the
dustbin of legal history by the adoption of pure comparative negligence.
103. Author Johnson observes that it was always his intent that the possibility
of full recovery by a faulty plaintiff at one end of the spectrum or the possibility
of a faulty defendant escaping liability altogether at the other end of the
spectrum would be rare and, thus, would be thereby "kept in relative check."
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However, potentially conflating duty and breach could be
troublesome because it arguably transfers power from the jury to
the court, and it arguably transfers power from the trial court to the
appellate court. 10 4 The more specific the cost-benefit analysis at
the duty level, the more conflation and power transfer that may
occur.
Finally, we know that there is cannon fodder for both plaintiff
lawyers and defense lawyers in the cases we have discussed. There
is fodder for those who support Robertson's view of comparative
fault and duty-risk and some fodder in Pitre for those who support
Johnson's view. And, perhaps, most prophetically, there will
continue to be cases where defendants argue (sometimes
successfully) that the openness and obviousness of the risk
involved justifies no recovery, under whatever legal name.
II. THE LEGISLATURE GETS INTO THE ACT: MODIFYING A PURE
COMPARATIVE FAULT SYSTEM

As we have seen in the preceding pages, we in Louisiana have
emerged from the benighted days when the affirmative defenses of
contributory negligence and assumption of the risk zeroed
plaintiffs based on their risky conduct even if the defendant was
more blameworthy and engaged in conduct that created far greater
risks than the plaintiff.105 Yet, our pure comparative fault regime
represents a swing of the proverbial pendulum to the other extreme
position. We now have plaintiffs who can recover whatever
percentage is allocated to defendants notwithstanding the
determination that the plaintiffs themselves are far more
blameworthy or that their conduct created substantially greater
risks than the conduct of the defendants. The dissatisfaction with
both extremes can be encapsulated in an example. A plaintiff who
is five percent at fault arguably should not be barred from
recovering from a defendant who is ninety-five percent at fault
(reflecting the discomfort with the old rules of contributory
negligence and assumption of the risk), and a plaintiff who is
104. Author Johnson does not necessarily regard this result-if it occurs-as
undesirable. Author Galligan is somewhat more concerned, although he
recognizes that it happens.
105. Benighted days? In any event, the trend has been away from the
contributory negligence bar, with only five jurisdictions (Alabama, the District
of Columbia, Maryland, North Carolina, and Virginia) clinging to that approach.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY §17 tbls.
(2000) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS]. For an instructive history
and discussion of contributory negligence and comparative fault, see
JAMES AND GRAY ON TORTS ch. 22 (3d ed. 2007).
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ninety-five percent at fault arguably should' 0 6 not recover anything
from a defendant who is a mere five percent at fault (reflecting the
dissatisfaction with pure comparative fault). 10 7 One possible
solution to the discomfort at both extremes is to eschew a pure
comparative fault regime in favor of a modified comparative fault
system that bars a plaintiffs recovery when the plaintiffs fault
allocation reaches a certain level relative to the defendant's fault
are
allocation.' 0 8 However, the modified comparative fault regimes
09
not necessarily a panacea, as elucidated by their detractors.1
As discussed in Part I, courts, whether properly or not, have
been active in crafting jurisprudential doctrines under which some
plaintiffs are denied recovery notwithstanding Louisiana's pure
comparative fault regime. The courts' reaction seems to be based
on a notion that there are plaintiffs who do such foolish things or
create such risks that it is not fair for them to recover. Thus, courts
are engaged in creating replacements for the old recovery-barring
defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk.
While the precise scope and name of these replacements is not yet
clear, their existence cannot be denied, even if they cannot be
coherently explained or understood. In contrast, modified
comparative fault regimes address this issue as part of the basic
rules of the system by barring recovery when a plaintiffs
allocation of fault reaches a certain level, most commonly fifty
percent or greater than fifty percent. Interestingly, pure
comparative fault is a system that all courts apparently cannot
countenance in all cases for all plaintiffs, as indicated by the
Louisiana courts' doctrines, such as open and obvious risk, that bar
some plaintiffs' recovery as outlined in Part I of this Article.
Still, there is very little that is concrete or predictable about the
courts' application of the open and obvious doctrine or other
doctrines that bar plaintiffs' recovery. Enter the legislature. And
while the legislation as a whole may not be coherent, individual
106. Author Galligan parts with his co-authors on the use of the word
"should" here and notes that, under Louisiana's pure comparative fault regime,
"should" must be replaced with "does."
107. See DOBBS, supra note 3, at 506 ("The complete system of comparative
fault often strikes casual observers as unfair."); John R. Grier, Comment,
Rethinking the Treatment of Mitigation of Damages Under the Iowa Comparative
FaultAct in Light of Tanberg v. Ackerman Inv. Co., 77 IOWA L. REv. 1913, 1919
(1992) ("Opponents of pure comparative fault contend it is morally unfair to allow
recovery by claimants bearing a majority of fault for an accident.").
108. DOBBS, supra note 3, at 505 (discussing the "pure or complete system"
of comparative fault and the "two incomplete systems"); Grier, supra note 107,
at 1919-20 (discussing the pure and modified comparative fault systems).
109.

See, e.g., HARPER, JAMES AND GRAY ON TORTS, supra note 105, ch.

22.15, at 464-65.
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statutes are clear and must be reckoned with. Since Louisiana's
legislative adoption of pure comparative fault, the legislature has
not been content to leave entirely to the courts the business of
denying recovery to foolish or faulty plaintiffs. The Louisiana
legislature has been very active in passing statutes that bar
recovery by plaintiffs (or their representatives) in certain defined
circumstances. The legislature does this in the form of statutes that
create "immunities" for defendants sued by plaintiffs who have
engaged in specified risky or blameworthy conduct or activities.
Some of these statutes focus on the blameworthy activity of the
plaintiff, and others are framed in terms of the defensible conduct
of the defendant in responding to a blameworthy plaintiff. These
statutes are somewhat more concrete and certain than the
jurisprudential doctrines, and they are clearly legislative exceptions
to the fundamental concept of pure comparative negligence. That
is, although all of the statutes require some fact-finding to
determine if the plaintiff's conduct brings her within the bar to
recovery, the conduct described in the statutes is more specific
than open and obvious risk. What is not apparent is whether the
statutes demonstrate any systematic pattern from a policy
perspective. Or, are they merely a patchwork of individual statutes
that individually deny recovery to the faulty plaintiff de jour? If
the latter is the case, then they are mere statutes, like common law
rules; they are not comprehensive in the spirit of the Louisiana
Civil Code.
This part of the Article discusses some of the Louisiana
statutes, enacted after comparative fault was adopted, that bar
plaintiffs' recovery. These present an interesting mosaic. In most
jurisdictions that have adopted comparative fault by legislation, the
legislature has opted for a modified system.I10 Louisiana is one of
the states in which the legislature has enacted a pure comparative
fault system. After considering the array of statutes enacted by the
legislature to bar some plaintiffs' recovery, one might posit that the
legislature has now chosen to modify substantially its nominally
pure comparative fault and has also expressed inferentially the
concept that the definition of "duty"--be it by a court or the
legislature-still has a role to play alongside pure comparative
negligence.
A. Felons-Fleeingor Committing
There have been a number of cases throughout the nation in
which a person was injured while committing a felony or fleeing
110. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 105, § 17 tbls.
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the commission of a felony and sued someone for her injuries. For
example, felons have sued property owners for conditions on their
property that injured the felon while she was committing the felony
or fleeing the scene."' In 1996, the Louisiana Legislature enacted
a statute, Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:2800:10, which
immunizes any person from damages suffered by a perpetrator of a
felony, while the person was committing the felony or fleeing the
scene. 12 It includes a provision common to the statutes discussed
in this part of the Article providing that it does not apply if the
injuries are caused by an intentional act involving excessive force.
The statute is like many of the others in that it completely denies
recovery to a very blameworthy plaintiff--one who commits a
felony.
Another feature of the statute that has been repeated in other
such statutes is the invocation of criminal law principles to deny
recovery. This is a feature that also renders the statute less
predictable and certain than the legislature might have desired.
Consider, for example, the case of Kirkland v. Entergy New
Orleans, Inc., in which a power company was sued for wrongful
death by the family of a person who broke into one of the
company's concrete vaults housing electrical equipment, only to be
electrocuted. 113 The defendant power company moved for
summary judgment, arguing that the family was barred from
recovery by operation of the statute." 4 As the court noted, the
result depended on whether the decedent was committing a
burglary or criminal property damage, which are felonies, or
111. See, e.g., Byers v. Radiant Group, LLC, 966 So. 2d 506 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2007).
112. 1996 La. Acts No. 46, § 1; LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.10 (2009).
Immunity from liability for injuries sustained while committing a
felony offense
A. No person shall be liable for damages for injury, death, or loss
sustained by a perpetrator of a felony offense during the commission of
the offense or while fleeing the scene of the offense.
B. The provisions of this Section shall apply regardless of whether the
injury, death, or loss was caused by an intentional or unintentional act
or omission or a condition of property or a building. However, the
provisions of this Section shall not apply if injury to or death of a
perpetrator results from an intentional act involving the use of
excessive force.
C. For purposes of this Section "damages" includes all general and
special damages which may be recoverable for personal injury, death,
or loss of or damage to property, including those otherwise recoverable
in a survival or wrongful death action.
113. See Kirkland v. Entergy New Orleans, Inc., 779 So. 2d 42 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 2001).
114. Id. at43.
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criminal trespass, which is a misdemeanor.'l 5 Because that issue
could not be determined from the materials filed on the summary
judgment the court decided that summary judgment was properly
denied. 11 g
The legislature's decision to deny recovery to felons has
obvious appeal, but as Kirkland demonstrates, the statute's
limitation of the bar to those committing felonies reduces the
certainty and often will make precise factual inquiries necessary.
Thus, if the legislature intended the statute as a vehicle to dispose
of such cases at a pretrial stage, such as summary judgment, the
statute may not achieve that result.
B. Drunk (orDrugged)Drivers, Alcohol Providers,and Social
Hosts

The legislature passed a statute in 1999 that denies recovery to
a plaintiff who sustains injuries while operating a "motor vehicle,
aircraft, watercraft, or vessel" while (1) legally intoxicated (blood
alcohol level of 0.08 or more) or under the influence of a
controlled or dangerous substance and (2) receiving an allocation
of fault of more than twenty-five percent, when his fault was a
contributing factor in causing the damages."17 A Louisiana court
115. Id. at44.
116. Id. at 45.
117. 1999 La. Acts No. 1224, § 1; LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2798.4 (2009).
Immunity from liability; injuries sustained by persons driving under the
influence of alcoholic beverages or drugs
A. Neither the state, a state agency, or a political subdivision of the
state nor any person shall be liable for damages, including those
available under Louisiana Civil Code Article 2315.1 or 2315.2, for
injury, death, or loss of the operator of a motor vehicle, aircraft,
watercraft, or vessel who:
(1) Was operating a motor vehicle, aircraft, watercraft, or vessel while
his blood alcohol concentration of 0.08 percent or more by weight
based on grams of alcohol per one hundred cubic centimeters of blood;

or
(2) Was operating a motor vehicle, aircraft, watercraft, or vessel while
he was under the influence of any controlled dangerous substance
described in R.S. 14:98(A)(1)(c) or R.S. 40:964.
B. The provisions of this Section shall not apply unless:
(1) The operator is found to be in excess of twenty-five percent
negligent as a result of a blood alcohol concentration in excess of the
limits provided in R.S. 14:98(A)(1)(b), or the operator is found to be in
excess of twenty-five percent negligent as a result of being under the
influence of a controlled dangerous substance described in R.S.
14:98(A)(1)(c); and
(2) This negligence was a contributing factor causing the damage.
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applied this statute to grant summary judgment to a business sued
by an eighteen-year-old employee who drank alcohol at the
business and then drove away and was injured in a vehicular
accident in Stewart v. DaquiriAffair, Inc." This statute actually
embraces a modified comparative fault approach, setting a
threshold level at which recovery is barred, but the bar-to-recovery
level is not fifty percent or fifty-one percent, but rather "in excess
of twenty-five percent." ' 19 This statute also does not seem likely to
dispose of cases at an early stage, such as summary judgment,
because it requires an allocation of fault, which is a fact-intensive
inquiry usually left to the jury.
The Stewart case also involved arguments regarding an older
Louisiana statute that bars plaintiffs from recovering against
alcohol providers and social hosts. 120 Some states have "dram

C. For purposes of this Section, "damages" include all general
damages, including those otherwise recoverable in a survival or
wrongful death action, which may be recoverable for personal injury,
death or loss, or damage to property by the operator of a motor vehicle,
aircraft, watercraft, or vessel or the category of persons who would
have a cause of action for the operator's wrongful death.
D. The provisions of this Section shall not apply if the operator tests
positive for any controlled dangerous substance covered by the
provisions of R.S. 14:98(A)(1)(c) or R.S. 40:964 and the operator is
taking that substance pursuant to a valid prescription for the identified
substance or a health care provider verifies that he has prescribed or
furnished the operator with that particular substance.
E. Unless the operator's insurance policy provides otherwise, nothing
in this Section shall be construed to preclude the operator from making
a claim under his or her own policy for first party indemnity coverages.
118. 20 So. 3d 1041 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2009), writ denied, 19 So. 3d 477 (La.
2009).
119. It should also be noted that in the Louisiana anti-dram-shop legislation,
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.1 (2009), the purveyor of alcoholic beverages has
no responsibility for injury to an intoxicated patron or to a third person, based on
the legislative declaration that the "proximate cause" of such injury is not the
providing of alcohol, but rather its consumption. The net effect of the statute, of
course, is that the purveyor of alcohol does not "share fault" with the imbiber as
would be dictated by the comparative negligence statute. Rather, the purveyor
has "no duty" to the imbiber, regardless of their relative fault, and has no duty to
third persons, either.
120. 1986 La. Acts No. 18, § 1; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.1 (2009).
Limitation of liability for loss connected with sale, serving, or
furnishing of alcoholic beverages
A. The legislature finds and declares that the consumption of
intoxicating beverages, rather than the sale or serving or furnishing of
such beverages, is the proximate cause of any injury, including death
and property damage, inflicted by an intoxicated person upon himself
or upon another person.
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shop" statutes that impose liability on providers of alcohol under
certain circumstances for harm caused by the customer or guest
who consumes the alcohol. In contrast, the Louisiana Legislature
in 1986 passed a reverse dram shop statute that immunizes a
licensed alcohol provider or social host provided that (1) the
alcohol is provided to a person of legal age to purchase and
consume, (2) there is no fraud or duress involved in the provision
and consumption of the alcohol, and (3) the damages that are the
subject of the suit occurred off the property of the alcohol
provider.121 The legislature stated in the statute that it was
immunizing the alcohol provider because consumption is the
"proximate cause" of injuries, and the insurer of the intoxicated
person should be primarily liable for injuries to third parties.12 2 In
Stewart, the plaintiff argued that Louisiana Revised Statutes §

B. Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, no person holding a
permit under either Chapter 1 or Chapter 2 of Title 26 of the Louisiana
Revised Statutes of 1950, nor any agent, servant, or employee of such a
person, who sells or serves intoxicating beverages of either high or low
alcoholic content to a person over the age for the lawful purchase
thereof, shall be liable to such person or to any other person or to the
estate, successors, or survivors of either for any injury suffered off the
premises, including wrongful death and property damage, because of
the intoxication of the person to whom the intoxicating beverages were
sold or served.
C. (1) Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, no social host
who serves or furnishes any intoxicating beverage of either high or low
alcoholic content to a person over the age for the lawful purchase
thereof shall be liable to such person or to any other person or to the
estate, successors, or survivors of either for any injury suffered off the
premises, including wrongful death and property damage, because of
the intoxication of the person to whom the intoxicating beverages were
served or furnished.
(2) No social host who owns, leases, or otherwise lawfully occupies
premises on which, in his absence and without his consent, intoxicating
beverages of either high or low alcoholic content are consumed by a
person over the age for the lawful purchase thereof shall be liable to
such person or to any other person or to the estate, successors, or
survivors of either for any injury suffered off the premises, including
wrongful death and property damage, because of the intoxication of the
person who consumed the intoxicating beverages.
D. The insurer of the intoxicated person shall be primarily liable with
respect to injuries suffered by third persons.
E. The limitation of liability provided by this Section shall not apply to
any person who causes or contributes to the consumption of alcoholic
beverages by force or by falsely representing that a beverage contains
no alcohol.
121. Id.
122. Id. § 9:2800.1(A); see supranote 119.
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9:2798.4 did not apply to her situation to bar her from recovering
from the daiquiri shop because she was underage, and thus
Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:2800.1 did not immunize the
shop. 123 The court rejected that rationale because the legislature
was aware of the earlier reverse dram shop statute when it passed
the later statute
24 and did not engraft an exception based on the
1
statute.
earlier
C. Criminal Trespassers
In 2003, the legislature passed another statute barring recovery
by plaintiffs who are injured while engaged in blameworthy
criminal conduct. Louisiana Revised Statutes § 14:63 provides that
owners, lessees, and custodians are not liable to a person injured
while trespassing on a structure, watercraft, or property. 125 Again,
there is an exception, making the bar to recovery inapplicable, this
custodian causes injury by "intentional
time if the owner, lessee, or 126
acts" or "gross negligence.
D. Defendants Using ReasonableForce in Defense of Person or
Property
A statute enacted in 2006 immunizes a person who uses
reasonable force to prevent a forcible offense against person or
property.12 7 The legislation invokes the criminal statutes on
123. Stewart, 20 So. 3d at 1042.
124. Id.at 1045-46.
125. 2003 La. Acts No. 802, § 1; LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:63 (2009). The
statute provides in part that:
The provisions of any other law notwithstanding, owners, lessees, and
custodians of structures, watercraft, movable or immovable property
shall not be answerable for damages sustained by any person who
enters upon the structure, watercraft, movable or immovable property
without express, legal or implied authorization, or who without legal
authorization, remains upon the structure, watercraft, movable or
immovable property after being forbidden by the owner, or other
person with authority to do so; however, the owner, lessee or custodian
of the property may be answerable for damages only upon a showing
that the damages sustained were the result of the intentional acts or
gross negligence of the owner, lessee or custodian.
Id.
126. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:63(H) (2009).
127. 2006 La. Acts No. 786, § 1; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.19 (2009).
Limitation of liability for use of force in defense of certain crimes
A. A person who uses reasonable and apparently necessary or deadly
force or violence for the purpose of preventing a forcible offense
against the person or his property in accordance with R.S. 14.19 or 20
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reasonable force (Louisiana Revised Statutes § 14:19)12 8 and
justifiable homicide (Louisiana Revised Statutes § 14:20)129 to
determine whether a defendant in a civil case used reasonable force
in defense of person or property. 13 Before the legislation was
enacted, courts actually had used the criminal statutes to determine
use of reasonable force in tort cases, but Louisiana Revised
Statutes § 9:2800.19 requires the use of the criminal statutes.
Moreover, the statute not only immunizes the defendant from
liability, but it also provides that a defendant who is sued and
prevails on the defenses established by the statute can recover from
the plaintiff attorneys' fees and other costs associated with the
litigation. 131 This, of course, negates the so-called "American
rule," under which each litigant is to bear his own costs of
litigation.
This legislation seems particularly significant in light of the
Louisiana Supreme Court's pre-statute decision in Landry v.
Bellanger132 In Landry, the plaintiff was hit and seriously injured
by the defendant, whom the drunken plaintiff had berated and
verbally provoked for a period of time in a bar.1 33 Finally, the
defendant asked the plaintiff to step outside, and the defendant
134
knocked him down to the concrete parking lot with one punch.
Although suggesting that comparative fault could apply to reduce
the plaintiffs recovery, the court finally concluded that the
defendant used reasonable force in self-defense because the
plaintiff had committed a battery by bumping the defendant with
35 The result was that the plaintiff was
his chest prior to the punch.'
36
barred from recovering.'

is immune from civil action for the use of reasonable and apparently
necessary or deadly force or violence.
B. The court shall award reasonable attorney fees, court costs,
compensation for loss of income, and all expenses to the defendant in
any civil action if the court finds that the defendant is immune from suit
in accordance with Subsection A of this Section.
128. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:19 (2007 & Supp. 2010).
129. Id. § 14:20.
130. Id. § 9:2800.19(2009).
131. See id.
132. 851 So. 2d943 (La. 2003).
133. Id. at 947-48.
134. Id. at 947.
135. Id. at 955-56.
136. Id. at 956.
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E. Defendants PermittingGuns to Be Stored in Cars
Perhaps the most unusual statutory bar to recovery is included
in Louisiana's "bring your gun to work" statute, enacted in
2008.137 The statute actually has much broader application than to
employers, listing "property owner(s), tenant(s), public or private
employer(s), or business entit(ies)" as being covered.' 3 8 The statute
essentially bans covered entities from prohibiting people who
legally possess guns from transporting them and storing them in

137. 2008 La. Acts No. 684, § 1; LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 32:292.1 (Supp.
2010).
Transportation and storage of firearms in privately owned motor
vehicles
A. Except as provided in Subsection D of this Section, a person who
lawfully possesses a firearm may transport or store such firearm in a
locked, privately-owned motor vehicle in any parking lot, parking
garage, or other designated parking area.
B. No property owner, tenant, public or private employer, or business
entity or their agent or employee shall be liable in any civil action for
damages resulting from or arising out of an occurrence involving a
firearm transported or stored pursuant to this Section, other than for a
violation of Subsection C of this Section.
C. No property owner, tenant, public or private employer, or business
entity shall prohibit any person from transporting or storing a firearm
pursuant to Subsection A of this Section. However, nothing in this
Section shall prohibit an employer or business entity from adopting
policies specifying that firearms stored in locked, privately-owned
motor vehicles on property controlled by an employer or business
entity be hidden from plain view or within a locked case or container
within the vehicle.
D. This Section shall not apply to:
(1) Any property where the possession of firearms is prohibited under
state or federal law.
(2) Any vehicle owned or leased by a public or private employer or
business entity and used by an employee in the course of his
employment, except for those employees who are required to transport
or store a firearm in the official discharge of their duties.
(3) Any vehicle on property controlled by a public or private employer
or business entity if access is restricted or limited through the use of a
fence, gate, security station, signage, or other means of restricting or
limiting general public access onto the parking area, and if one of the
following conditions applies:
(a) The employer or business entity provides facilities for the
temporary storage of unloaded firearms.
(b) The employer or business entity provides an alternative parking
area reasonably close to the main parking area in which employees and
other persons may transport or store firearms in locked, privatelyowned motor vehicles.
138. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 39:292.1(C) (Supp. 2010).

2010]

RUMINATIONS ON COMPARATIVE FAULT

1143

their vehicles while in parking lots.' 39 In exchange for depriving
covered entities of the power to forbid guns in cars, the statute
gives them an immunity, providing that they will not be liable in
any civil action for "damages resulting from or arising out of an
occurrence involving a firearm transported or stored [in
compliance with the statute] .,,140 Although it has not been applied
yet, this statute potentially creates a very broad immunity or bar to
recovery. Interpreted broadly, a covered entity could be immune in
any situation involving a person who transports a gun in a car to a
covered entity, retrieves it, and causes injury. About nine states
have enacted similar statutes in the past two years or so, and the
scope of the immunity is uncertain.14
III. IN SuM: LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL MODIFICATION OF PURE
COMPARATIVE FAULT

The combination of jurisprudence and legislation immunizing
defendants or barring recovery by plaintiffs who have engaged in
particular types of conduct leads to the conclusion that neither
Louisiana's judicial system nor its legislature has been content
with the pure comparative fault system articulated in article 2320,
although their manifested lack of content has been case-specific
and focused rather than broadly policy-based. As noted, rather than
the legislature replacing pure comparative fault with a modified
comparative fault regime, the courts and the legislature have
episodically chipped away at the statutory pure comparative
negligence system. Would it be better for the legislature to
acknowledge the obvious discomfort that the two government
branches have demonstrated with pure comparative fault and
replace it with a modified scheme? The answer may depend on
whether one favors a corrective justice approach to tort law or an
instrumentalist approach. 142 If one prefers a corrective justice
approach to see justice done in each particular case, then a
modified comparative approach would vest the jury with the power
to allocate fault, thus barring recovery if a certain relative level of
fault is assigned. If, on the other hand, one prefers an
instrumentalist approach, one may prefer for a legislature to carve
139. See id.§ 39:292.1.
140. Id.§ 32:292.1(B).
141. See, e.g., Stefanie L. Steines, Comment, Parking-Lot Laws: An Assault
on Private-PropertyRights and Workplace Safety, 93 IOWA L. REv. 1171
(2008).
142. See, e.g., Frank L. Maraist, Of Envelopes and Legends: Reflections on
Tort Law, 61 LA. L. REv. 153, 159 (2000) (discussing the different schools of
thought regarding tort law).
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out immunities based on societal policies rather than reaching the
"right" result on a case-by-case basis. More cynically, one may
favor the legislative approach because special interests may be able
to use their political clout to obtain immunities.
CONCLUSION

Louisiana is not unique in its evolution from tort doctrines that
completely bar plaintiffs' recovery to a comparative fault regime
that favors allocation of fault and reduction of recovery for
blameworthy plaintiffs. Nor is Louisiana unique in clinging to the
notion that there are some plaintiffs in some situations who should
be barred from recovery, based on their fault, even when a
blameworthy defendant causes them harm. Louisiana may be
unique in the nation, however, in the way it has reached this result.
After the legislature adopted pure comparative fault and the state
supreme court recognized that this was an all-subsuming regime
that left no room for implied secondary assumption of the risk, the
courts and the legislature began carving out exceptions to pure
comparative fault, barring recovery for some plaintiffs in some
situations. This has been Louisiana's journey. As it stands now,
one may ask whether this piecemeal approach to denying
foolhardy plaintiffs recovery followed by the courts and the
legislature is a just, coherent, and reasoned approach. In our
attempts to answer some fools according to their folly, have we
been wise or, in our efforts to achieve justice, fallen to folly?

